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 
Abstract—Gas-fired power stations currently generate over a 
third of the electricity demand of the United Kingdom (UK) and 
will play an increasing role in the future. At the same time the UK 
is becoming increasingly reliant on external supplies for gas 
security. The levels of physical and economic interaction between 
the gas and electricity systems offer a new set of risks for energy 
security. This paper traces the development of the UK gas 
industry, its growing links with the electricity sector and sets out 
some of the important developments in Europe and within the UK 
that influence UK energy security 
 
Index Terms—natural gas industry, network reliability, 
pipelines, power system economics, power transmission planning. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
AS fired power stations currently generate over a third of 
the electricity demand of the United Kingdom (UK). With 
the retirement of nuclear plants and the carbon emission 
reductions achieved by the closure of coal-fired power plants, 
natural gas will continue to play a large role in generation 
structure in the future. This growing dependence on gas for 
electricity generation is happening at the same time as a 
progressive decline in indigenous UK gas supplies. This is 
leading the UK to be increasingly reliant on external supplies 
for gas security. In addition, the increasing proportion of gas 
generation raises the level of physical and economic interaction 
between the gas and electricity networks which may imply 
increase security risks for electricity.  
This paper will trace the development of the UK gas 
industry and its developing links with the electricity sector. It 
sets out some of the important developments in Europe that 
affect UK energy security but also points to the need for 
vulnerability assessments of the infrastructure within the UK. 
The paper is set out as follows. Section II gives a brief 
overview of the development of the UK gas industry to the 
present date and the possible future. Section III brings in the 
European dimension while Section IV looks at UK 
infrastructure. 
                                                         
This work is funded through the EPSRC Supergen V, UK Energy 
Infrastructure (AMPerES) grant in collaboration with UK electricity network 
operators working under Ofgem‟s Innovation Funding Incentive scheme – full 
details on http://www.supergen-amperes.org/. 
The authors are with the Institute for Energy Systems, School of 
Engineering and Electronics, University of Edinburgh, Mayfield Road, 
Edinburgh EH9 3JL, U.K. (emails: James.Whiteford@ed.ac.uk; 
Gareth.Harrison@ed.ac.uk; Janusz.Bialek@ed.ac.uk). 
II.  GAS AND THE UK ENERGY INDUSTRY 
A.  A brief history of the UK gas industry 
The development of the UK gas industry broadly mirrors 
that of the electricity sector by developing from local 
production and distribution, through large scale integration in 
the public sector to privatisation. From the nineteenth century 
onwards, a series of local private and municipally-owned gas 
companies grew up to supply their local area with gas 
produced by gasification of coal („town‟ gas). Following the 
1948 Gas Act [1] which nationalised the industry, over 1000 
producers and distributors were merged into twelve area gas 
boards with a Gas Council set up to overlook their operation. 
The Gas Council began the process of interconnecting these 
disparate systems to develop the national gas grid. 
To meet growing demand, new sources of gas were sought 
and Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) shipments were delivered from 
the Gulf of Mexico and Algeria from 1963. At the same time, 
surveys of the area known as the UK Continental Shelf 
(UKCS) in the North Sea uncovered a plentiful untapped 
undersea reserve of natural gas. Extraction started in 1967 and 
government policy was that the resource should be used to its 
full potential as soon as possible to reap the maximum benefit. 
This policy led to the UK becoming completely self sufficient 
in terms of meeting natural gas demand and imports of LNG 
were no longer required [1]. The 1972 the Gas Council was 
replaced by British Gas Corporation (BGC) and all gas 
produced on the UKCS had to be sold to BGC. It also led to 
the twelve gas boards becoming regional boards meaning that 
they became responsible for a particular geographical area.  
The Thatcher Government took its first steps towards 
liberalisation of the UK gas industry with the 1982 Oil and Gas 
Act which looked to reduce the monopoly power of BGC by 
allowing gas producers to supply customers directly and have 
third party access rights to the National Transmission System 
(NTS). The 1986 Gas Act returned the entire gas industry to 
the private sector as British Gas plc (BG) which had 
responsibility for transmission, distribution and supply. Despite 
third parties‟ access to pipeline infrastructure, there were 
complaints of inadequate competition and BG was referred to 
the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) in 1987. 
This resulted in several measures to open the market and a 
second review in 1993 led to the Government agreeing to open 
the domestic gas market to competition by 1996 [2].  
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After the 1995 Gas Act, BG was split up into replaced by a 
transport company (Transco, now National Grid), an upstream 
company (BG international) and a downstream company 
(Centrica). A new gas regulator was created (Ofgas now 
Ofgem) to oversee regulatory functions necessary in the new 
market design along with the government (DTI now BERR). 
The British Gas brand was retained for domestic supply but by 
May 1998 the entire market was open to competition with 
consumers able to choose their gas supplier. 
B.  The ‘dash-for-gas’ 
During the late 1980s and into the 1990s, a significant shift 
was witnessed in the power generation sector in the UK. 
Coined the “dash-for-gas”, Britain went from having next to no 
gas-fired generation to having over 14 GW of installed 
combined cycle capacity by 1997. The level of investment in 
the period between 1990 and 1995 can be seen in Fig. 1 and it 
shows that the change in the UK is much larger than other 
nations. The capacity as of 2008 stands at 27 GW [3]. 
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Fig.  1.  Combined Cycle Gas Turbine capacity installed, 1990-95 [4] 
 
The unusual burst of investment in Combined Cycle Gas 
Turbine (CCGT) technology can be attributed to a number of 
factors. Pre-privatisation, natural gas was regarded as too 
valuable a fuel to use for power generation, although modest 
amounts of open cycle GTs were available for peaking. The 
arrival of the indigenous UKCS supplies occurred 
simultaneously with advances in CCGT technology; prior to 
the 1980s, CCGT plants played a very minor role in power 
generation until advanced gas turbine units were developed 
that could achieve thermal efficiencies of 48%, making them a 
very viable option for investors. Coal-fired generation became 
unpopular due to acid rain concerns in the late 80s with 
companies required to fit flue gas desulphurization (FGD) to 
new plant, adding considerably to power plant capital and 
running costs. Gas-fired generation was seen as a good 
alternative both economically and environmentally. The 
changed investment conditions associated with privatisation 
also played a key role in the „dash-for-gas‟ allowing less capital 
intensive CCGT to be supplied by foreign equipment suppliers 
into a technologically-sparse marketplace [5]. 
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Fig.  2.  Decline of UKCS natural gas production [6]. 
  
C.  Decline in UKCS production 
This “dash-for-gas” contributed in part to the eventual 
decline in UKCS natural gas production. As domestic gas 
consumption rose significantly, more and more gas was being 
drawn from indigenous North Sea supplies to meet demand. 
Rather than the government looking to protect and prolong 
supplies (as was practiced in Norway, for example), policy 
change in the 1980s led to the fastest possible promotion of 
UKCS natural gas production. In addition, following the 
opening of an Interconnector to Belgium (running Bacton to 
Zeebrugge) gas was now able to flow to the Continent when 
the market allowed. Britain enjoyed a period of plentiful 
exports of natural gas due to the low price of the gas compared 
to the high oil-indexed prices on the Continent driven up by the 
high oil prices in 2000 [7]. This also contributed to a steady 
decline in the UKCS reserves. Fig. 2 shows how the reserves 
have recently declined and projections of how they will 
continue to do so over the coming years. 
D.  Security of supply and reliance on imports 
In 2006 the UK ceased to be a net exporter of natural gas 
and became a net importer due to the decline in indigenous 
supply [6]. Gas imports are currently meeting around one third 
of the UK's total annual demand and could rise to as much as 
80% by 2020 [6]. Fig.  3 shows the increasing reliance on 
imports into the future in the UK and Fig.  4 shows a simplified 
schematic of the European pipeline network. This raises a 
number of questions regarding the security of gas supply into 
the future as the UK becomes more dependent on outside 
sources to meet gas demand. Indeed, a deeper interest has 
developed over the state and position of the liberalisation of 
the European natural gas market. The UK gas market is 
viewed as one of the most liquid markets in the world and the 
most liquid in Europe. This means exposing its mature, 
competition-orientated gas market to the less mature gas 
markets in Europe which may be more focused on domestic 
industry or national interest than on ensuring European-wide 
competition. The development of liberalisation in Europe is 
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discussed in the next section. 
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Fig.  3.  Current, under construction and proposed import capacity in the UK 
[6]. 
 
III.  THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION 
A.  Background to the European liberalization process 
Only a few countries have the advantage of having 
substantial natural gas reserves that are large enough to meet 
domestic needs and facilitate significant export to other 
countries. Considerable investment was needed to connect 
these few countries, Norway, the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands and Denmark, with other European load centres 
via an extensive pan-European pipeline network. This then led 
to the development of an extremely pro-nationalistic 
framework, where national organisations were set up, quite 
often with the heavy involvement of the State, to co-ordinate 
the high-pressure transmission system. These national co-
ordinators were also tasked with the negotiation of the various 
import and export transactions required to bring gas from the 
few production regions to the many European load centres. 
This background makes the harmonisation of the internal 
European natural gas market fraught with difficulties. 
 
  
 
Fig.  4.  Schematic of the European gas network [8]. 
 
B.  First EU Gas Directive  
In 1998 the EU Member States approved the first EU Gas 
Directive (1998-98/30/EC). This was the first and necessary 
step on the long road to achieving full market liberalisation 
within Europe. The key objective of the Gas Directive was “to 
provide fluidity in gas flows and improve security of supply and 
industrial competiveness” in Europe [9]. The directive was, 
however, rather restricted in its approach. It only required 
“appropriate and efficient mechanisms for regulation, control 
and transparency so as to avoid any abuse of a dominant 
position, in particular to the detriment of consumers, and any 
predatory behaviour.”[9] This was seen as rather vague and led 
to a wide range of interpretations by many of the Member 
States. There was a noted absence of any guidelines for a tariff 
structure or access conditions to pipelines.  
C.  Second EU Gas Directive  
The second Gas Directive (2003-2003/55/EC) was 
implemented in 2003. It was to address many of the 
weaknesses present in the first directive and its focus became 
more specifically the “creation of a fully operational internal 
gas market, in which fair competition prevails.” It set out a 
number of specific changes to the running of the market [10]: 
 regulated third party access to the transmission and 
distribution system is mandatory, 
 vertically integrated players are required to legally 
separate monopoly business,  
 the market opening timetable set down by the first gas 
directive was brought forward 
 each member state should designate competent bodies 
with the function of regulatory authorities which are 
wholly independent of the interests of the gas industry.  
D.  Security of supply directive  
In addition to establishing rules for a well functioning 
internal gas market through the first two directives, the 
European Community wanted to provide measures that would 
also safeguard an adequate level for the security of gas supply. 
The directive (2004- 2004/67/EC) set out certain instruments 
that were to be used by each Member State to enhance the 
security of gas supply, including [11]: 
 gas supply source diversification and gas storage 
 provision of pipeline capacity to enable diversion of 
supplies and system flexibility 
 interruptible demand and back-up fuels for power 
generation  
 domestic production  
 long term contracts 
 transmission system operators cooperation to coordinate 
dispatch 
 infrastructure investment for gas imports via re-
gasification terminals and pipelines. 
 
These only serve as guidelines to the Member States. 
However they are required to ensure that supplies for 
household customers inside their territory are protected to an 
appropriate extent at least in the event of [11]: 
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1. A partial disruption of national gas supplies during a 
period to be determined by Member States taking into 
account national circumstances. 
2. Extremely cold temperatures during a nationally 
determined peak period. 
3. Periods of exceptionally high gas demand during the 
coldest weather periods statistically occurring every 20 
years. 
Although well intentioned, these measures remain open to 
interpretation.  
E.  Towards full liberalization  
Regulation 1775/2005 was agreed upon in September 2005 
and its main aim was to remove the remaining barriers towards 
achieving full liberalisation of the internal gas market. There 
was a need for additional technical issues to be addressed that 
were not in the second gas directive, in particular regarding 
third party access services, principles of capacity allocation 
mechanisms, congestion management services and 
transparency requirements. This regulation was met with some 
resistance by a few member states, because they didn‟t feel that 
the second directive had been given enough time to have its full 
effect but regardless of this the European Parliament added 
some amendments and approved it [12].  
To progress further towards full energy market liberalization 
across Europe a third energy package has been announced and 
will be introduced to [13]: 
 Treat energy and environmental issues together, 
 Treat gas and electricity equally, 
 Completely unbundle ownership of transport and sales, 
 Create a European agency of energy regulators to 
monitor cross-border issues, 
 Give the responsibility for energy security and market 
integration to member states and companies. 
 
Although progress has been made in achieving full 
liberalization, it is still an ongoing process with a long way to 
go. As the UK enters into an era of reliance upon outside 
sources to meet gas needs, this will raise concerns. However, 
there are still matters closer to home that need to be dealt with 
before attention is drawn towards what is happening in Europe. 
IV.  UK ENERGY SECURITY 
A.  Security of domestic infrastructure 
The UK government response to the growing reliance on 
imports is to focus its concerns over security of supply issues 
on the continent rather than on risks to domestic infrastructure. 
An energy review consultation published by the DTI (now 
BERR) on “The effectiveness of current gas security of supply 
arrangements” in October 2006 showed there is an over-
emphasis on matters beyond our borders with no attention 
given to our own infrastructure security. Jonathan Stern of the 
Oxford Institute for Energy Studies points this out in his 
response to the consultation [14]: 
“While the emphasis of future security analysis is on 
external threats, the evidence from the recent past... 
demonstrates that the main problem has been the failure 
of domestic commercial and regulatory framework to 
provide adequate security of supply” 
 
Several recent events have underlined the need to 
investigate more closely the adequacy of UK infrastructure at 
meeting our security of supply needs: 
1. The most significant event was the Rough fire incident on 
February 16
th
 2006 which led to the tightest  
supply/demand balance experienced. Rough is by far the 
largest storage site in Britain and is the only strategic 
storage that can be called upon when the supply/demand 
balance is tight. The fire meant that the site was down for 
nearly 5 months. It has been put down to good fortune 
that the event didn't occur at the beginning of the winter 
in November 2005 or at the end of the winter in 
April/May 2006, otherwise physical rationing would have 
been required because there was insufficient gas to meet 
demand. 
2. In July 2007 the CATS pipeline supplying the Teesside 
supply terminal on the NTS was damaged and it took 
three months to repair. The demand deficit had to be 
made up from the modest gas storage resources.  
3. In February 2008 a fire at the Bacton terminal resulted in 
it being out of service for over a month. On its own the 
incident was not significant enough to cause the system 
balance any real problems, it certainly would have been a 
problem if a similar incident had occurred elsewhere on 
the network simultaneously.  
 
These few incidents are used to illustrate a point, that 
domestic gas infrastructure is not as secure as it needs to be. 
With greater demand for gas into the future, more stress will be 
put on the system which may lead to incidents becoming more 
commonplace. In addition to estimating the likelihood of such 
events occurring, it is also essential to begin to consider the 
impact of them should they occur. 
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Fig.  5.  Current UK generation mix [15]. 
 
With the large and growing contribution of gas-fired 
generation this means examining not only the gas infrastructure 
but also the electrical infrastructure interacting with it. 
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Interaction between gas and electricity networks 
The growing dependence on gas for electricity generation 
which will only continue to rise into the future, as shown in 
Figures 5 and 6, means that it is now impossible to decouple 
the security of the electricity supply from the security of the 
gas supply. 
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Fig.  6.  Projected UK generation mix for 2020 [16]. 
 
The issues already raised in this paper will directly impact 
the security of the electricity transmission system. 
 
 
Fig.  7.  Simplified schematic of the UK NTS [17] 
B.  Design and operation of the National Transmission System 
The National Transmission System (NTS) is owned and 
operated by National Grid Gas plc and it is used to transport 
gas that arrives via 8 input terminals to 8 Gas Distribution 
Networks (GDNs) operated by 4 GDN operators: National 
Grid Gas plc., Scotia Gas Networks plc, Northern Gas 
Networks Ltd. and Wales and West Utilities. Fig.  7. shows a 
simplified schematic of the NTS. It consists of 6,600 km of 450 
– 1220mm diameter pipeline and operates at pressures ranging 
from 45 to 85 bar with 26 compressors that currently help 
maintain system pressure at the extremities. Agreement over 
the use of the UK gas transportation system is managed for all 
interested parties by the operation of a Unified Network Code 
(UNC). There is also a Transportation Principal Document that 
defines the rules and an Offtake Arrangements Document 
which governs the day to day agreements between the NTS 
and GDN system operators.  
The system is designed in the steady state using daily 
demand and the supply/demand condition assumed for design 
conditions is a 1 in 20 peak day condition, which means that 
the system will only fail to supply forecast demand on average 
one year in twenty although multiple failures are allowed in 
that year. This is based on Composite Weather Variable 
(CWV) data dating back to 1928.  
A “Design Margin” is applied to the steady state analysis of 
the system to cater for events that are not modelled within the 
design and which otherwise may cause failure, these events are: 
 Failure of a compressor, 
 Forecast error – up to the peak demand required by a 
Distribution Network, 
 Supply Failure. 
 
Statistical relationships have been developed industry 
analysts for the likelihood of these events occurring 
simultaneously and transient analysis is used to derive the level 
of support necessary in the design of the pipes to ensure there 
would be no failure of the system. Currently this level of 
support is 5% and it is applied as a flow margin during network 
analysis. There is also pressure cover that is used in addition to 
this which stipulates an elevated pressure requirement for the 
extremities of the system. Practically, these design 
requirements are met in the network through increased pipe 
diameter or increased power requirements for compression. 
With a greater stored volume of gas due the “Design Margin”, 
there is sufficient time to manage the system at peak demand 
conditions when the system is stretched and an unplanned 
event or incident would cause a failure of the network to 
maintain adequate pressure to support downstream systems. 
This time that is provided to manage the system could be seen 
as the equivalent of the N-2 standard used in electricity 
network design; this time is limited though to just a couple of 
hours. This extra time enables the System Operator (NGG) to 
act accordingly to mitigate the issue perhaps through the 
withdrawal from storage systems or by relying on the On-the-
Day Commodity Market (OCM) to make up the shortfall.  
In the steady state design it is naturally assumed that the 
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profile for the directly connected and DN demands of the 
system are completely flat. But with increasing reliance on gas 
to fuel electricity generation, this assumption may no longer be 
enough to ensure that the separate gas and electricity 
transmission systems are being designed with this growing 
interaction taken into account. This is particularly the case 
when gas generation is required to operate flexibly when gas is 
the marginal fuel and where large volumes of wind generation 
is connected. 
C.  Combined gas-electricity network analysis 
The issues mentioned in this paper show that there is a need 
for a detailed combined gas-electricity network scenario 
analysis which will investigate future network reliability into 
the long term. This is required to achieve a number of goals: 
 Accurately model the growing interaction between the 
gas and electricity systems into the future such that the 
adequacy of the infrastructure to cope with a growing 
variability of daily demand from directly connected power 
stations is assessed 
 Investigate domestic security events (such as the loss of 
supply routes/major pipelines) and the impact they might 
have on both the gas and electricity systems 
 Assessment of the growing reliance upon the less 
liberalized gas markets on the continent and what impact 
certain continental security events might have on gas and 
electricity infrastructure 
 
Such an analysis will require detailed information from both 
network operators in order to serve as actual representation of 
the impacts this increasing interaction will have on the real 
networks. The analysis will also be used to show the potential 
for integrated operation and planning in order to enhance fuel 
delivery and overall network security.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
Through looking at the historical context from which the 
UK gas industry has evolved, this paper has shown that the UK 
energy sector is moving into a period of increasing uncertainty. 
The depletion of the UK Continental Shelf and an increased 
domestic demand for natural gas have raised concerns that 
what was once a secure national gas market, is now under 
threat from entering further into a less liberalized European 
market context. Most importantly, the UK electricity sector is 
also being increasingly affected due to an ever-rising reliance 
on natural gas for generation. It has been argued that a detailed 
combined scenario analysis of the UK gas and electricity 
networks is required to ensure the security of the UK energy 
supplies for the years to come. 
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